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Abstract 
Budgetary constraints are prompting many governments to encourage private financing 
of transportation infrastructure through concession contracts. The length and complexity 
of such contracts often force governments to provide fiscal support in order to increase 
the attractiveness of concessions. This paper deals with a new public support 
mechanism for concession contracts, called Subordinated Public Participation Loans 
(SPPLs), which has been implemented in Spain during the last few years. SPPLs are 
subordinated loans that may be given by the government to the concessionaire if the 
latter requests them in the tender. SPPLs are defined in such a way that the increase in 
interest accrued will reflect the traffic level: the larger the traffic the larger will be the 
SPPL yield. SPPLs have a twofold goal. First, they increase the financial attractiveness, 
and hence the feasibility, of concessions contracts. And second, they set up a fairer risk-
sharing approach between the public and the private sector. This paper analyzes the 
implications of SPPLs in motorway concessions by contrasting the theoretical analysis 
with the empirical results obtained form the tender of five motorway concessions in 
Spain. Overall we found that the implementation of this mechanism may be considered 
a success. In spite of that, we propose some measures that may contribute to improving 
the SPPL performance in the future. 
 
2INTRODUCTION 
 
Many countries around the world are making a major effort to avoid public deficits, and 
to that end they are imposing considerable budgetary constraints on the public funding 
for transport infrastructure facilities. However, reducing the investment in public 
infrastructure does not seem wise given the evidence of studies which stress the 
significant effect of public capital stock, together with R&D, in promoting both 
sustainable economic growth, and social equity in developed economies (Aschauer 
1999; Aghion et al. 1999). 
 
This is the reason why many governments are implementing new ways to encourage 
private participation in financing and operating transport infrastructure. One of the most 
common ways of implementing private participation is through the concession system, 
which consists basically of transferring construction, maintenance, and operation of the 
infrastructure to a private consortium, in exchange for which that consortium receives 
the right to charge a user fee, for a period of time, fixed or variable, as contractually 
agreed upon in advance. As Vassallo (2004) describes, infrastructure concessions 
incorporate some features that distinguish them from other construction and 
maintenance contracts, and also from the basic asset privatization procedure. 
 
In some cases, concession contracts are backed by the government through fiscal 
support measures such as subsidies, in-kind grants, traffic or exchange guarantees, and 
so on. The implementation of those measures has two main goals. The first one is to 
make financially feasible a project that because of its positive externalities is good for 
society as a whole. And the second one is to mitigate risks that otherwise would be 
deemed unmanageable by private stakeholders. 
 
This paper assesses the implementation of Public Subordinated Participation Loans 
(from now on referred to as SPPLs) in Spain. Those loans intend both to increase the 
financial feasibility of toll motorway concessions in Spain and to set up a fairer means 
of traffic risk-sharing between the concessionaire and the government. The intent of this 
paper is to evaluate the performance of SPPLs on the basis of the empirical results 
obtained from the tender of five toll motorway concessions in Spain. 
 
3After this introduction, the first section of the paper summarizes the history of toll 
motorway concessions in Spain. The second section presents the reasons why public 
support is often required for backing infrastructure concessions. The third section of the 
paper describes how SPPLs work. To that end, we analyze the effects that the SPPL 
layout has on the strategic behavior of the bidders, and then we compare this theoretical 
approach with the empirical results obtained from the analysis of the offers presented by 
the bidders in five concession tenders. The paper ends with a set of lesson based on the 
Spanish experience that may help improve the performance of SPPLs in the future. 
 
MOTORWAY CONCESSIONS IN SPAIN 
 
Spain has extensive experience in financing toll motorways through concession 
contracts. Unlike some other European countries, such as France (Fayard and Bousquet 
1998) and Italy (Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer 1993), motorway concessions in Spain were 
all competitively awarded and mostly funded by the private sector. Since the late 1960s 
more than 30 motorway concessions have been granted in Spain. In 2004 the length of 
the toll motorways already awarded totaled 3,257 km, of which 2,788 km. were in 
operation and 470 km. in construction. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, toll motorways in Spain were not always awarded according to the 
same criteria. We can identify three different periods: from 1967 to 1975, from 1976 to 
1995, and from 1996 to the present. Between 1967 and 1975, 2,042 km. were granted 
(almost 2/3 of the present length of toll motorways in Spain). There are two reasons 
why toll motorway concessions were used by the government as a means of expanding 
and improving the Spanish motorway network during this period. First, the economic 
growth that Spain experienced during those years prompted a great rise in traffic so 
better motorways were suddenly necessary. And second, the public budget in Spain was 
not able to afford such a huge investment; private financing was the only alternative to 
reach that goal. 
 
(Fig. 1 app. here) 
 
In this period, motorway concessions in Spain enjoyed several advantages compared to 
other industries. The main ones were fiscal deductions, loan guarantees, and exchange 
4insurance provided by the State for those loans denominated in foreign currency. 
Despite the high risk that those measures might entail for the public budget in the future, 
they were regarded by the government as the only way to attract private capital for 
funding the motorway program. 
 
The two petroleum crises that the industrialized countries experienced in the 1970s had 
a huge impact on the guarantees provided by the Spanish government to motorway 
concessions. On the one hand, the rise of gas prices caused traffic growth to be lower 
than expected. On the other hand, exchange rates became substantially unstable. These 
factors triggered the guarantees initially incorporated in the contracts, which ultimately 
became highly expensive for the government. The government continues to meet the 
financial commitments made in the early 70s. In fact, from 1969 to 2001, the amount 
paid by the government to foreign lenders for the exchange insurance totaled 4,514.5 
million euros, which makes up almost 50% of the total investment in toll motorways. 
 
The results of the implementation of concession contracts in Spain during this period 
were rather controversial. On the one hand, motorway concessions achieved the goal of 
providing the country with a modern motorway network at a time when the public 
budget of Spain was not able to afford such a huge cost. On the other hand, the 
guarantees committed by the government to facilitate concessions’ funding became very 
costly for the country over time (Izquierdo 1997). 
 
The second stage goes from 1975 to 1995. In this period, very few motorway 
concessions were awarded. There were several reasons. First, the two petroleum crises 
in the 70s destabilized the Spanish economy. Second, after Franco’s death, the political 
atmosphere in Spain was uncertain. Third and most important, the socialist government, 
which took office in 1982 and remained until 1996, was politically opposed to 
promoting private concessions as a means to finance motorways. 
 
Instead of toll motorways, the socialist government developed the so-called 
“Expressways Program” in order to meet the urgent needs for building the high capacity 
network that Spain’s stable economic growth demanded. The government opted for 
modernizing the Spanish road network by widening and upgrading the most important 
roads, turning them into double-track fast lanes with quality standards well below those 
5for toll motorways. This new program was completely funded by the public sector, 
which constituted a significant burden for the Spanish budget. The low quality of the 
upgraded roads (“autovías” in Spanish) became evident in the high rates of accidents, 
more than 50% higher than the rates of accidents that occurred on toll motorways. 
 
The third stage lasted from 1996 to 2004. In 1996, the conservative Popular Party took 
office in Spain after 14 years of Socialist government. Its main challenge was to 
incorporate Spain into the European project for adhering to a single currency, which 
involved a great effort towards achieving several macroeconomic convergence criteria 
(public deficit, public debt, inflation, and so on). The need to contain Spain’s public 
deficit was the most difficult challenge for the new government. This was the main 
reason why the new government decided to implement once again the concession 
system so as to encourage the participation of the private sector for financing new 
transportation infrastructure. That way, the government was able to maintain the 
infrastructure investment pace, while at the same time managing to contain the public 
deficit. From 1996 to 2004, 1,003 kilometers of motorways concessions were granted, 
and 755 kilometers were actually built, and are now being managed, in Spain. 
 
This new trend towards private funding was reinforced by a new Law, approved in 
2003, which widened and updated the old Toll Motorway Law passed in 1972. The 
objectives of this Law were, among others, to update the old motorway concession 
model and extend it to every type of public works, to reinforce the contribution of 
private financing for constructing and maintaining public facilities, and to improve the 
legal framework by defining a new risk-sharing approach (Vassallo y Gallego 2005). 
 
The negative consequences of the public guarantees implemented in Spain in the period 
1967 to 1975 prompted the Spanish government to progressively limit their application. 
As a consequence, the new Law passed in 2003 considerably restricted public 
guarantees, even though it incorporates several mechanisms whereby the public sector 
could eventually contribute to the financial feasibility of concession contracts. 
 
Nowadays, SPPLs are the most important public instrument for supporting private 
concession contracts in Spain. The law approved in 2003 regulates the use of those 
loans. The application of this instrument has a threefold objective: first, to make 
6projects unlikely to be profitable otherwise, to be nonetheless attractive for the private 
sector; second, to provide public resources without increasing the national public 
deficit; and third, to establish a fair traffic risk-sharing approach in concession contracts. 
 
FISCAL SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS 
 
Fiscal support measures 
Irwin (2003) identifies five government objectives for implementing fiscal support in 
infrastructure concessions: internalizing externalities in infrastructure markets, 
overcoming failures in markets for financing infrastructure, mitigating political and 
regulatory risks, circumventing political constraints on prices and/or profits, and 
redistributing resources to the poor via infrastructure available to all. There are six 
possible instruments of fiscal support: cash subsidies, in-kind grants, tax breaks, capital 
contributions, guarantees against risk under the government’s control, and guarantees 
against risks not under the government’s control. Similar instruments have been 
implemented in several countries around the world. 
 
During the last years, the United States of America has encouraged the implementation 
of several kinds of capital contributions designed by the Federal Government to 
promote private participation in infrastructure financing. To that end, the Federal 
Government has put into effect some policy programs whose main goal has been to 
bridge the investment gap between available resources and transportation infrastructure 
needs. Among these programs, we can highlight the promotion of State Infrastructure 
Banks (SIBs) and the TIFIA Program (Federal Highway Administration 2000). 
 
In the case of motorway concessions in Spain, the government has had two major 
reasons for implementing public support measures in infrastructure concessions. First, it 
wishes to mitigate risks difficult for the private sector to predict or handlesuch as 
force majeur risk, regulatory risk and, in some cases, traffic risk; and second, to increase 
the private financial feasibility of projects which are sociallydesirable, particularly in 
regions where traffic demand is not enough to generate revenues to reach the break-
even point (Vassallo y Gallego 2005). This approach has also been employed in other 
countries such as Chile (Gómez Lobo e Hinojosa 2000). 
 
7Fiscal support for mitigating traffic risk 
Although the evolution of traffic during the life of a concession can be estimated, traffic 
growth depends on factorssuch as the economic growth of the country and the 
competition with other transportation modes or new infrastructure facilitiesnot
controllable at all by any of the stakeholders. 
 
There are several detailed studies of traffic risk inaccuracies. In 2004, Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) compared first-year forecasted traffic levels with actual traffic volumes 
for 82 projects. The results of the study showed that during the first year, traffic 
volumes averaged about 76% of their predicted values, and the error–measured through 
the standard deviation–was 0.26 (Bain and Wilkins 2002) and (Bain and Plantagie 
2004). A recent large-scale study by Flyvbjerg et al. (2005) also compares the real and 
the forecasted traffic after the first year of operation. This study focuses primarily on 
free roads (from small regional roads to important motorways), carried out primarily by 
public authorities, rather than private promoters, and situated mostly in Northern 
Europe. The Flyvbjerg’s study reports substantial forecasting errors; the standard 
deviation estimated is 0.44. Those studies prove how inaccurate traffic estimates can be. 
 
Evidence gathered from around the world show how the whole allocation of traffic risk 
to the concessionaire may cause unexpected and undesirable effects for the government 
(Izquierdo and Vassallo 2005). If traffic becomes ultimately higher than expected the 
concessionaire will make extrarevenues as a consequence of an unexpected economic 
boom rather than as a consequence of its effort to be more efficient. If traffic becomes 
lower than expected, concessionaires will generally try to force a renegotiation with the 
government, which in the end may be costly for society. Those effects have prompted 
some governments to put into effect guarantees to mitigate traffic risk in motorway 
concessions. There are many different mechanisms for mitigating traffic risk through 
fiscal support guarantees. A classification scheme for them can be found in (Vassallo 
2006; Vassallo y Sánchez Soliño 2007). 
 
Consequences for the government of fiscal support measures 
Gauging the fiscal effect of a specific support measure is a very complicated issue, 
particularly when it is a public guarantee. While the estimate of the cost of cash-
subsidies is almost immediate, the estimate as to the future effect of guarantees given by 
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concession performance, which in turn depends on many variables (GDP, interest rate 
and so on). Guarantees create liabilities that are contingent rather than inevitable and 
thus difficult to evaluate. 
 
Guarantees may trigger large payments by the government in the future if the 
circumstances intended to trigger such payments ultimately occur. This is the reason 
why one of the main concerns regarding fiscal support for infrastructure concessions is 
the accurate evaluation of the level of risk that the government is assuming. The 
simplest way to approach the government exposure to these guarantees is to calculate 
the present value of the expected contributions to be paid by the government during the 
life of the contract. The present value of these flows is the value of the contingent 
liability that the government is assuming because of the guarantee. Lewis and Mody 
(Lewis and Mody 1997) show some examples of methodologies to estimate those 
contingent liabilities in Colombia and the Philippines. A similar methodology has also 
been implemented in the United States of America in order to allow for the risk 
assumed by the government in awarding TIFIA loans and guarantees (United States 
Department of Transportation 1998). Since the enactment of the Federal Credit Reform 
Act (FCRA) in 1990, Federal Agencies have been required to set aside capital reserves 
to cover the expected long-term cost to the Government in advance of issuing a direct 
loan, line of credit or loan guarantee. Information on budgeting for Federal credit 
programs and accounting for Federal credit is found in OMB Circulars A-11 and A-34. 
 
SUBORDINATED PUBLIC PARTICIPATION LOANS IN SPAIN 
 
Regulation of SPPLs in Spain 
SPPLs were first regulated by Law 7/1996 as a subordinated financial instrument. One 
of the main characteristics of SPPLs is that lenders should receive variable interest 
depending on the results obtained by the borrowing company. The criteria to be 
employed for determining the results can be based on profits, revenues, sales or 
whatever other variable is demanded by the government to be included, or agreed to by 
the parties to the contract. The new Concessions Law 13/2003, recently approved in 
Spain, reinforced the role of participation loans as a means of financing infrastructure 
concessions. When the government decides to offer SPPLs as a means of fiscal support 
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as long as they comply with the following rules: 
 
- Subordinated Participation Loans have always to be subordinated to senior debt. 
Consequently, participation loan holders (the government in the case of SPPLs) will 
be paid back only after the concessionaire has met its obligations with the senior 
lenders. However, the participation loan holders will be paid back before the 
shareholders receive any dividend. 
 
- The expected rate of return of SPPLs has to be related to the performance of the 
concession. In other words, the better the results of the concessionin terms of 
traffic, sales, benefits or whatever other variable is specified in the contractthe 
greater the rate of return of SPPLs. 
 
- The expected rate of return to be obtained by the SPPL holders must be in 
accordance with the level of risk assumed by them. This means that the expected 
yield of SPPLs should be market-based. 
 
Subordinated public participation loans (SPPLs), which are studied in this paper, can be 
classified as capital contributions to a project provided by the government because the 
main goal of SPPLs is to turn a project whose profitability is uncertain into a financially 
feasible one. Yet, unlike other capital contributions, SPPLs also have a direct effect on 
the traffic risk sharing approach of the concession, since the higher the real traffic in 
relation to that previously forecasted, the higher will be the interest rate to be paid by 
the concessionaire to the government. This way, additional, unpredicted profits will be 
shared between the concessionaire and the government. If ultimately the real traffic is 
much higher than expected, the government will receive higher interest rates, while the 
concessionaire will have lower profits. Consequently, the government’s incentive 
coincides with the concessionaire’s incentive since the better the project performs, the 
larger the SPPL interest will be. This is the reason why SPPLs are regarded as a creative 
means of promoting PPP projects for motorway concessions. 
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SPPLs have some differences compared with the loans given by the State Infrastructure 
Banks (SIBs) in the United States. First, in Spain, the projects entitled to receive SPPLs 
are designated by the Government, whereas the SIBs operate on a competitive basis 
with many projects vying for the same pool of funding in a given cycle. Second, the 
interest rate yield by SPPLs depends on the level of traffic whereas it is fixed for the 
loans awarded by the SIBs. Overall both programs are similar in that they are primarily 
gap funding agreements to complete the project financing. However, the SPPL program 
leverages risk whereas the SIB program typically leverages product. 
 
SPPLs have as well important advantages in terms of national accounting. Unlike 
subsidies, SPPLs have the advantage of being treated, for accounting purposes, as a 
financial investment according to the European National Accounting Standards defined 
by EUROSTAT. As long as those financial investments are made on market-based 
conditions, SPPLs will have no influence on the national public deficit. 
 
Characteristics of SPPLs in motorway concessions in Spain 
Although SPPLs have mostly been implemented in toll motorway concessions contracts 
awarded by the central government of Spain, they have also been implemented by 
regional and local governments for motorway and airport concessions. In this section, 
we go into further detail about the characteristics of the SPPLs implemented by the 
central government of Spain to finance motorway concessions. The characteristics of 
SPPLs are defined by the government in the bidding terms. They consist basically of 
two things: first, the interest rate to be paid each year depending on the results of the 
concession; second, the amortization rate of the SPPL principal. 
 
The bidding terms establish a maximum SPPL amount to be requested by the bidders. 
Usually the concessionaire is not allowed to ask for an SPPL greater than 50% of the 
predicted investment, though the government can in exceptional circumstances permit a 
higher percentage. 
 
The bidding terms define as well the SPPL draw-down schedule. The term of the loan is 
generally the concession term. The principal of the loan is to be paid back during the 
last years of the concession contract (in some cases only during the last year, operating 
like a zero-coupon bond). In that case, the Spanish business accounting rules force the 
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concessionaire to set up a provision in the liabilities side of the balance-sheet. This 
provision has to be added to every year in increments so that, at the end of the 
concession contract, the amount of this provision is equal to the principal to be paid 
back to the government. The annual increment of this provision is treated as an expense 
in the annual income statement of the concession company. 
 
The interest of SPPLs is to be paid by the concessionaire on a yearly basis. The annual 
amount depends on the level of traffic. The bidding terms define two reference traffic 
bands (Band A and Band B) in terms of annual average daily traffic (AADT). These 
bands are used as a base from which to calculate the interest every year. The interest is 
calculated as follows: 
 
- If the traffic in year i is lower than the bottom limit of Band A, the interest rate is 
equal to the SPPL amount times 1.75%. 
 
- If the traffic in year i is within Band A, the interest rate will be equal to the largest 
of either the SPPL principal times 1.75%; or the 35% of the extra revenues obtained 
over the bottom limit of Band A. It is important to note that in the latter case the 
interest rate does not depend on the SPPL amount. 
 
- If the traffic is within Band B, the interest rate will be equal to the larger of either 
the debt principal times 1.75 or 35% of the extra revenues over the bottom limit of 
Band A plus 15% of the extra revenues over the bottom limit of band B. This means 
that over band B, the concessionaire will pay back 50% (35%+15%) of the extra 
revenues obtained. 
 
Traffic Band A is defined between 1+X and 1+Y times the traffic demand estimated by 
the government, and Band B is defined above 1+Y times the traffic demand estimated 
by the government. X and Y vary depending on the project, but X and Y are usually 
around 0.1 and 0.25 respectively. This way, the higher the real traffic above those bands 
the higher will be the SPPL interest to pay. 
 
Figure 2 depicts graphically how the mechanism to calculate the yearly interest rate 
works. The upper graph shows how Bands A and B are defined in relation to the 
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estimated traffic (short-stretch broken line). The lower graphs included in Figure 2 show 
a cross-section analysis (in year i) of how the SPPL interest is calculated in terms of the 
traffic in year i for two cases: a small SPPL amount (case 1) and a larger SPPL amount 
(case 2). The thick continuous line of those graphs shows the interest as a function of 
the traffic in year i. If the traffic falls below the bottom limit of Band A, the interest to 
be paid will be constant and related to the principal of the SPPL. This way, the larger 
the SPPL requested, the larger will be the interest that is to be paid. 
 
(Fig. 2 app. here) 
 
If traffic falls within Band A, we can distinguish two zones. Between traffic TiA and s1
for case 1 and between traffic TiA and s2 for case 2, the interest will be exactly the same 
as if the traffic in year i was below Band A. Consequently, the interest amount will 
depend on the SPPL principal but not on the real traffic. However, between s1 and TiB
for case 1, and between s2 and TiB for case 2, the interest amount will depend on the real 
traffic but not on the SPPL principal requested. As the lower graph of Figure 2 shows, 
the larger the SPPL principal the larger will be the stretch where interest does not 
depend on the real traffic. If traffic falls within Band B, the increment of the interest 
with the real traffic in year i will be larger than within Band A. 
 
The motorways tendered under the SPPL approach have been awarded to the bidder 
who reaches the highest total score (between 0 and 800 points) calculated in terms of 
three different criteria: 
 
- Technical quality of the offer (400 points). 
- Feasibility of the proposal and technical and financial solvency of the promoters 
(250 points). 
- Economic efficiency of the offer (150 points). 
 
The technical criteria seem to have been very important since they have a weight of 
50% (400 points of out 800). However, in the end these criteria were not as important as 
they initially seemed. As most of the bidders adopted the same referential projects 
provided by the government with only slight variations, the score obtained by them was 
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in the end quite similar. The second set of criteria refers to the feasibility of the financial 
plan of the project and the credibility of the estimates presented by the bidders. 
 
The last criterion (economic efficiency) intends to encourage economic competition 
among bidders. This criterion is evaluated in terms of the amount of SPPL that each 
bidder requests of the government. In that respect, the higher the SPPL requested, the 
lower will be the score reached, and consequently the lower will be the probability of 
that bidder being granted the concession contract. Bidders consequently have a huge 
incentive to reduce the SPPL requested. 
 
The calculation of the interest of SPPLs along with the procurement mechanism adopted 
causes the bidders to approach different strategies depending on both the traffic they 
expect in the motorway and the financial support they need. Four different strategies 
may result as a combination of traffic expected and financial support needed. Those 
strategies are summarized in Table 1. 
 
(Tab. 1 app. here) 
 
If a bidder expects the traffic to be below the lower limit of Band A during the 
concession term, it will be convenient for it to request a large amount of SPPL because 
below Band A the interest rate of the SPPL requested will be very cheap compared to 
private senior loans. However, as previously said, the greater the SPPL requested, the 
lower the tender score, and consequently the lower the probability of being awarded the 
contract. For this reason, if the traffic expected is low, and the financial support needed 
is large, the bidder will naturally request a large SPPL, in order that he may take part in 
the tender. However, if the traffic expected is low, and the financial support needed is 
small, the bidder will request only the SPPL needed in order to be as competitive as 
possible in the tender. 
 
If the traffic expected by a bidder is high, the strategy turns out to be much more 
complicated since the cost of the SPPL will increase regardless of the SPPL principal 
requested. If that bidder needs small financial support, such a bidder will tend to request 
a zero SPPL because even a small amount of SPPL will be extremely expensive in the 
long run. If that bidder needs larger financial support, the strategy becomes even more 
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confusing. If the expected cost of the SPPL is larger than the cost of the senior private 
debt, the bidder will not take part in the tender. If it is smaller, it will request a large 
amount of SPPL. 
 
As the traffic expected has necessarily to be inversely correlated with the financial 
support needed, most of the bidders will tend to situate their offers in the area of the two 
shaded boxes. Consequently, the SPPL requested in a tender will tend to be either zero 
or quite large. 
 
This theoretical finding can be contrasted with the empirical results available to us from 
the tenders that took place in Spain in 2004. Table 2 shows the behavior of the bidders 
in the Ocaña-La Roda motorway tender. The shaded row shows the ultimate winner of 
the concession. It is necessary to note that in Spain, each bidder can present as many 
offers as it wants. That fact explains why bidder 2 presented four different alternatives 
and bidders 1, 4 and 5 presented three different alternatives. 
 
(Tab. 2 app. here) 
 
The maximum SPPL that the government allowed to be requested was 81 million euros. 
It is easy to note that the bidders’ behavior was extreme. Some of them requested zero 
SPPL whereas some others requested a SPPL amount close to the maximum. This 
pattern is consistent with the rest of the toll motorway concession tenders that were 
awarded under this scheme. 
 
Practical implementation of SPPLs in motorway concessions in Spain 
SPPLs have been implemented in toll motorway concessions in Spain during the last 
few years. Table 3 shows the main characteristics of the motorways procured in Spain 
under the SPPL approach. In the last three years, six motorway concessions were 
awarded. The total length of the motorways built was 454.8 kilometers of which 345.2 
were tolled. The investment under the program totaled 2,421.4 million euros. 
 
Five concessions were tendered in 2004. Four of them were successfully awarded, and 
one of them (the Parbayón-Zurita Motorway) was not ultimately awarded because none 
of the bidders was able to reach the minimum standards established by the government 
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since the perception that private promoters had of this project was quite different from 
the government’s initial estimates. In 2006, a new project (the Málaga-Alto de las 
Pedrizas motorway) was tendered under the SPPL approach. At the time of writing this 
paper, this project had not yet been awarded. 
 
The second block of Table 3 shows a summary of the tender process for the five 
motorway concessions that were procured under the SPPL approach. Several 
conclusions arise from that Table. First, there were many bidders that attended the 
tender and some of them presented more than one offer so it seems that the competition 
for the concessions was fierce. Second, the average SPPL requested in the different 
offers was around 2/3 of the maximum total SPPL committed by the government. Third, 
in spite of that, three out of the four consortia that ultimately won the tenders offered 
not to receive any SPPL. And fourth, the standard deviation of the SPPL requested in 
different offers was quite large. This last conclusion is a direct consequence of the 
strategic incentive that was previously analyzed. 
 
In order to compare the dispersion of the SPPL with the dispersion of other variables 
declared by the bidders in the tender, the last block of Table 3 estimates the Pearson 
index for several variables in each of the concessions. The Pearson index is calculated 
as the standard deviation of the distribution divided by the average of the distribution. 
The higher the Pearson coefficient the higher will be the dispersion of the distribution. 
 
The last block of Table 3 shows the Pearson coefficient for several variables declared by 
the bidders in their offers. It is noticeable that the project investment and the project 
IRR have low Pearson coefficients. That means that the dispersion of the different offers 
for those variables was quite low. However, the SPPL requested by the offers has a 
Pearson coefficient much higher than the rest of the variables. This fact reinforces the 
statement that was previously presented. The way in which the SPPL interest is 
established encourages the bidders to request either a zero SPPL or to request a high 
SPPL. 
 
(Tab. 3 app. here) 
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LESSONS 
 
The objectives of the application of SPPLs in Spain were basically three: 
 
- To promote a PPP mechanism in order to make financially feasible concession 
projects that are not profitable enough to be funded only by the private sector. 
- To promote a public support measure for motorway concessions that does not 
enlarge the national public deficit. 
- To introduce a fairer traffic risk-sharing mechanism. 
 
The first objective seems to have been achieved since many promoters attended the 
motorway tenders, which turned out to be very competitive. In this respect, the 
introduction of SPPLs permitted many promoters, regardless of their personal view of 
each project, to take part in the tenders. The second objective was also achieved, 
because the government had to provide only 101.0 million euros for raising 1,790.4 
million euros of capital investment in motorways. That amounts to only 5.6% of the 
total investment. Moreover, the SPPLs did not increase the public deficit of the country. 
The third objective was achieved only in part, since the risk mitigation approach that 
SPPLs offer serves to spread traffic risk only when traffic is higher than expected, but if 
traffic is lower than expected, the concessionaire has to bear the whole traffic risk. 
 
This mechanism, however, has received two main criticisms; the high risk that the 
government is actually taking on by giving SPPLs; and the inappropriate definition of 
the SPPL interest and principal payback, which creates perverse incentives. 
 
The first criticism says that in the end SPPLs are disguised subsidies from the 
government because, even though they are defined so as to comply with the 
EUROSTAT accounting rules, nobody has ever demonstrated that they are awarded 
under market-based conditions. Moreover, as the principal is wholly paid back during 
the last year of the concession contract, the government is taking on a risk made even 
greater in case the concession goes into bankruptcy. 
 
The second criticism is directed at the seemingly strange incentives created by the SPPL 
layout. As it was dealt with in a theoretical way, and demonstrated by the empirical data 
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we currently possess, the SPPL interest definition encourages the bidders to request 
either a zero SPPL or a large SPPL amount. This issue has been also corroborated by 
the authors in a set of interviews held with several private promoters. Basically all the 
companies argue that the way in which the interest rate is calculated discourage them 
from asking for any SPPL amount if traffic is expected to be high. This incentive may 
cause concessionaires to assume risks larger than they should. 
 
To sum up, we can conclude that SPPLs are a very interesting and useful instrument for 
promoting PPP approaches in infrastructure concessions. SPPLs have demonstrated 
their usefulness in reinforcing competition, improving the feasibility of concession 
projects, and creating a fairer traffic risk distribution. However, there are some ways to 
improve further the effectiveness of SPPLs. 
 
First, there should be some independent entity that evaluates the real risk that the 
government is assuming by providing SPPLs. For each project, this independent entity 
could calculate the expected loss for a certain statistically significant level so as to 
evaluate the risk assumed by the government. The sum of the expected losses of all the 
projects should be considered as the contingent liability that the government is assuming 
by giving SPPLs. That contingent liability should, for accounting purposes, be 
considered as a provision that affects the national public deficit. This way, the 
government will have the correct incentive for providing SPPLs when necessary. An 
example of this type of independent assessment of the government’s contingent 
liabilities is the OMB credit scoring methodology for TIFIA loans in the United States. 
 
The second recommendation is to improve both the principal payback profile and the 
interest calculation approach for SPPLs. On the one hand, it seems less risky for the 
government that the concessionaire pays back the principal each year instead of paying 
it back only during the last year of the concession. On the other hand, establishing an 
annual interest calculation that, even though related to the size of traffic, remains 
dependent as well upon the SPPL principal, may help to reduce the negative effect 
previously described. 
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FIGURE 1. Length of motorway concessions in Spain 
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FIGURE 2. SPPL interest calculation 
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TABLE 1. Strategic behavior of bidders with SPPLs 
 
TRAFFIC EXPECTED 
LOW HIGH 
LARGE Great SPPL 
Out of the tender 
Great SPPL 
FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT 
NEEDED SMALL Needed SPPL Zero SPPL 
TABLE 2. SPPL requested in the Ocaña-La Roda Motorway 
 
BIDDER SPPL REQUESTED
NPV OF THE 
REVENUES
NPV OF THE 
OPERATION 
COSTS
NPV REVENUES 
MINUS COSTS
80,190 769,771 154,284 615,487
76,140 769,771 154,079 615,692
0 896,907 193,551 703,357
0 1,165,364 220,278 945,086
0 1,165,364 220,684 944,681
0 1,165,364 220,738 944,626
3 0 1,078,456 165,399 913,058
68,500 960,849 231,646 729,203
0 946,649 253,749 692,901
0 1,104,573 154,842 949,732
0 1,077,633 154,842 922,791
6 0 767,712 176,979 590,733
7 0 1,146,170 292,249 853,921
8 54,000 832,701 164,500 668,201
1
2
4
5
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TABLE 3. Summary of motorway tenders in Spain with SPPLs 
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MAXIMUM SPPL PERMITTED  
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PROCUREMENT YEAR 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2006 0
STATE Awarded Awarded Awarded Awarded Not awarded
To be 
awarded 0
NUMBER OF BIDDERS 6 8 8 8 7 37
NUMBER OF OFFERS 10 13 13 14 8 58
MAXIMUM SPPL PERMITTED  
(million €) 200 203 55 81 125 664
AVERAGE SPPL REQUESTED  
(million €) 149 153 21 15 105 444
STANDARD DEVIATION SPPL 
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